Formal Validity and Legal Integrity: A Review of Hans Kelsen’s and Ronald Dworkin’s Philosophy of Law on Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023

Abstract

This paper examines Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023, which added an alternative requirement to the minimum age of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, through Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity. There are two research questions: (1) how is the decision assessed from the standpoint of legal validity under Kelsen’s theory, and (2) how is it assessed from the standpoint of principle and integrity under Dworkin’s theory. The study uses normative legal research with conceptual, case, and statutory approaches. The findings indicate that the decision remains formally valid and binding because the Court’s judgments are final under the Constitution, and the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court (MKMK) did not annul it even though it found a serious ethics violation by the then Chief Justice. However, the decision is difficult to defend under Dworkin’s integrity criterion, because the principle of impartiality was compromised and the Court’s reasoning was inconsistent with its own decisions issued on the same day. The paper concludes that the case reveals a gap between validity and legitimacy that pure formal theory cannot close, and recommends institutional safeguards on recusal and judicial reasoning.