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Revitalizing Consensus Deliberation and Community-Based Integrity in Indonesian Village Governance

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ABSTRACT
This study examines how consensus-oriented deliberation is regulated in Indonesian village governance, whether the existing framework supports community-based integrity, and how it can be strengthened. It employs normative legal research using statutory and conceptual approaches to the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 6 of 2014 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2024, Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019, and Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 20 of 2018. Primary legal provisions and recent peer-reviewed studies are analyzed through grammatical, systematic, and functional interpretation. The study identifies a layered framework distinguishing Village Deliberation (Musyawarah Desa) from Village Consultative Body meetings. While the law guarantees participation, information, and accountability, the annual financial accountability agenda remains weakly connected to Village Deliberation, and public deliberation does not confer the same formal voting role as representative bodies. A six-year planning reference in the ministerial regulation also diverges from the eight-year period established in 2024. The article proposes harmonized planning rules, recurring public accountability hearings, accessible financial disclosure, inclusive representation, documented responses to dissent, and a legally consistent procedure for deliberative deadlock. Its contribution is a rights-conscious and implementable framework linking consensus with continuous community oversight.

ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini menganalisis pengaturan musyawarah mufakat dalam tata kelola desa, kecukupannya dalam menopang integritas berbasis komunitas, serta arah revitalisasi normatifnya. Penelitian hukum normatif ini menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan konseptual terhadap UUD NRI 1945, UU Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 sebagaimana diubah dengan UU Nomor 3 Tahun 2024, Permendesa PDTT Nomor 16 Tahun 2019, dan Permendagri Nomor 20 Tahun 2018. Bahan hukum dan kajian ilmiah mutakhir dianalisis melalui penafsiran gramatikal, sistematis, dan fungsional. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa terdapat dua forum dengan fungsi berbeda, yakni Musyawarah Desa untuk persoalan strategis dan musyawarah BPD untuk fungsi perwakilan serta pengambilan keputusan tertentu. Meskipun hak partisipasi, informasi, dan akuntabilitas telah diatur, pertanggungjawaban keuangan tahunan belum terhubung secara memadai dengan agenda Musyawarah Desa, sedangkan kewenangan warga dalam penganggaran belum setara dengan forum perwakilan. Ketentuan jangka waktu perencanaan enam tahun pada peraturan menteri juga belum selaras dengan perubahan undang-undang tahun 2024 menjadi delapan tahun. Penelitian ini menawarkan harmonisasi norma perencanaan, forum pertanggungjawaban publik berkala, keterbukaan informasi keuangan, keterwakilan inklusif, pencatatan pendapat berbeda, serta prosedur penanganan kebuntuan musyawarah yang sesuai dengan hukum. Kebaruannya terletak pada konstruksi integritas berbasis komunitas yang menghubungkan musyawarah mufakat dengan pengawasan warga secara berkelanjutan.

INTRODUCTION

Consensus deliberation (musyawarah mufakat) occupies an important position in Indonesian constitutional culture. The fourth principle of Pancasila presents collective decision-making through wisdom in deliberation and representation rather than reducing democracy to a numerical contest. At the village level, this ideal is encountered in meetings where residents, their

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representatives, and local officials discuss development priorities and collectively consequential choices. Nevertheless, affirming consensus as a national value is not the same as demonstrating that a particular meeting enables meaningful participation. Syarif and Yaqin (2026) observe that deliberation in local leadership selection may be influenced by primordial or group preferences, while Syarwi (2022) distinguishes consensus democracy from simple majoritarian aggregation. The central question is therefore not only whether a village convenes a meeting but whether the meeting genuinely enables affected residents to shape decisions.

Evidence from village development planning shows a recurring disparity between procedural inclusion and substantive influence. Raharjo et al. (2021) describe development planning meetings in two villages in Bantul where the formal sequence of consultation existed but participant comprehension and the opportunity to shape outcomes remained limited. Pratiwi et al. (2026) likewise identify unequal control over agenda setting and priorities in the village planning process. Damayanti and Syarifuddin (2020) found that village development forums often involved representatives closely connected to the authorities rather than an inclusive cross-section of residents. These studies do not establish that all Village Deliberations are ineffective; instead, they reveal an empirical risk that a formal invitation can be mistaken for participation capable of affecting a decision. The resulting normative problem concerns the obligations attached to representation, openness, reasons, and the follow-up of decisions.

The Village Law, Law No. 6 of 2014, accords Village Deliberation (Musyawarah Desa, hereafter Musdes) an institutional role through Article 54, which brings together the Village Consultative Body (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD), the village government, and community representatives to discuss strategic matters. A separate BPD deliberation process handles particular representative decisions, including village regulations. These bodies should not be treated as interchangeable: they differ in constituency, legal function, and decision procedures. Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019 supplies further procedural principles of inclusion, accountability, and consensus, while Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 20 of 2018 regulates village financial management. The resulting legal architecture is neither normatively empty nor fully self-executing. Participation becomes effective only when its place within budgeting, oversight, and the right to demand explanations is sufficiently clear (Rachadian & Sulistyaningsih, 2023; Sharon & Arif, 2024).

The issue has become more significant following Law No. 3 of 2024, which amended the Village Law. The new legislation introduces an eight-year village medium-term development planning period and provides for reporting and public information obligations, including accountability before Musdes at the end of a village head's term. However, the six-year planning period remains in the definitional provisions of Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019. Regulatory comparison should not presume that every difference in wording produces invalidity; it should identify whether a subordinate procedural rule still corresponds to the current statute. The regulation's reference to Musdes as a forum for reaching agreements also requires interpretation alongside the Village Law's emphasis on deliberating strategic matters. These questions demand grammatical and systematic analysis rather than an assumption that a meeting can acquire additional statutory powers solely through ministerial wording.

Community-based integrity is defined in this article as the capacity of residents to participate in determining collective priorities, obtain comprehensible information, scrutinize the use of public resources, and seek an accountable response from village decision-makers. This understanding is narrower than the claim that deliberation automatically prevents corruption. Putri et al. (2023) show why transparent procedures and internal controls must be considered jointly in the prevention of village-level corruption. Permatasari et al. (2024) raise comparable

concerns about anomalies and accountability in village fund reporting. Research on community trust further suggests that financial openness can have effects distinct from formal accountability declarations (Sofyani et al., 2021). Accordingly, integrity must be treated as an institutional capability that can be evaluated through enforceable access, scrutiny, and follow-up—not simply as a desirable attitude.

Existing studies chiefly examine village deliberation as an observed practice, the effects of local representation, or accountability in village funds. Turmudi and Iksan (2024) emphasize the democratic foundations of Village Deliberation; Uway et al. (2024) study the role of the BPD; and Briansyah and Umar B (2024) identify participation challenges in local governance planning. Meanwhile, scholarship on village financial management concentrates on transparency, community participation, and reporting rather than on the functional relationship between the two deliberative forums (Sofia & Fitriyah, 2022; Merawati et al., 2024). The contribution of this article is to integrate these strands into a doctrinal test of whether the current regulatory configuration makes consensus capable of sustaining community oversight throughout the fiscal and accountability cycle.

This study addresses three questions: how is consensus deliberation constructed and differentiated across the Village Law and its implementing regulations; to what extent does that construction support community-based integrity; and what targeted legal reforms could strengthen it without substituting village consultation for institutions already assigned legal authority? The analysis proceeds from a mapping of the legal hierarchy to an assessment of participation, financial accountability, normative harmonization, and decision-making impasses. It then develops a set of prescriptive safeguards for more meaningful village deliberation.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses normative legal research with statutory and conceptual approaches. Its object is the formulation, hierarchy, and interrelationship of legal provisions regulating Musdes, BPD deliberation, village planning, and financial accountability; it does not measure the implementation of a specific village's decision-making process. The primary legal materials comprise the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 6 of 2014 on Villages, Law No. 3 of 2024 amending that law, Law No. 12 of 2011 as amended by Law No. 13 of 2022 on lawmaking, Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019 on Village Deliberation, and Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 20 of 2018 on village financial management. These instruments were examined using their official texts and relevant amendments.

Secondary materials consist of peer-reviewed studies on consensus, village representative institutions, participatory planning, public financial accountability, and local governance. Recent literature was selected purposively for direct relevance and for its ability to clarify the implications or limitations of the positive-law provisions. This is a doctrinal synthesis, not a systematic review, and no screening totals, survey respondents, or field observations are claimed. Research from coastal policy, land disputes, and religious mediation is used only as a limited functional analogy when discussing participation, conflict resolution, or the institutional recognition of community mechanisms (Harry et al., 2025, 2026; Putri & Harry, 2025).

Materials were coded by the legal issue they address: (1) constitutional and statutory foundations; (2) distribution of authority between Musdes and BPD; (3) procedural rights and participation; (4) village budget and accountability; (5) inter-regulatory consistency; and (6) mechanisms for handling unresolved disagreement. Grammatical interpretation examined the formulations “deliberate” (memusyawarahkan) and “agree” (menyepakati), while systematic interpretation located each provision within its authorizing statute and the hierarchy of laws.

Functional comparison assessed whether the legal arrangement supplies identifiable opportunities to obtain information, participate meaningfully, challenge a proposal, and monitor implementation.

The prescriptive stage distinguishes existing obligations from proposals for reform. Its evaluative criteria are legality, meaningful participation, information accessibility, reason-giving, accountability, proportionality, and administrative feasibility. Interpretive limits arise from differences between legal norms and actual village practice, and from the absence of new field data. Accordingly, the proposed safeguards constitute normative recommendations to be examined further in implementation studies, not empirical findings that they have already produced particular outcomes.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Consensus Deliberation as a Constitutional Value and Village Governance Principle

The normative foundations of village deliberation are layered. The fourth principle of Pancasila provides a framework for collective decision-making grounded in representative deliberation. Article 18B(2) of the 1945 Constitution recognizes customary law communities and their traditional rights subject to constitutional conditions. Law No. 6 of 2014 places deliberation, participation, democracy, mutual assistance, and familial solidarity among the principles relevant to village regulation (Article 3). These sources do not render every local customary practice legally binding; they require that the value of consensus be interpreted alongside the statutory competences and constitutional rights of other persons. Turmudi and Iksan (2024) describe varied local deliberative traditions, whereas Syarwi (2022) emphasizes the rationale of protecting minorities within consensus-based decision-making.

The Village Law also distinguishes general principles of governing from the more specific procedure of Musdes. Article 24 refers to administrative accountability, openness, participation, and local wisdom, while Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019 expressly incorporates consensus deliberation among the principles of Musdes. The regulation adds expectations of equality, justice, transparency, and inclusiveness. This difference is not, in itself, a substantive conflict: statutory general principles may be operationalized through more detailed subordinate provisions if those provisions remain within delegated authority. The legal test is whether the regulation clarifies how residents participate in existing statutory processes or purports to reassign decision-making powers reserved by law to another body.

Consensus is valuable only insofar as a disagreement can be expressed without intimidation and citizens can understand the proposal under discussion. Deliberation does not require unanimity of private beliefs; it requires a transparent opportunity to contest reasons and identify a decision that participating interests can live with. The empirical observations of Raharjo et al. (2021), Pratiwi et al. (2026), and Damayanti and Syarifuddin (2020) demonstrate why procedures should protect a diversity of participants and not merely prescribe the existence of a meeting. These findings are used here to diagnose a risk in regulatory design, not as proof of how any particular Musdes decided its agenda.

Two Deliberative Forums and the Distribution of Authority

Article 54 of Law No. 6 of 2014 establishes Musdes as a deliberative forum involving the BPD, village government, and elements of the community for strategic matters. The law lists such matters as village structuring, planning, cooperation, investment arrangements, village-owned enterprises, the addition and release of village assets, and extraordinary events. Other statutory provisions connect strategic decisions concerning village assets and cooperation to deliberative agreement. The regulation of Musdes therefore concerns a set of public issues with consequences

beyond the immediate meeting. The legal function of the forum cannot be reduced to conveying the government's final decision after the fact.

The BPD performs a distinct representative function under Article 55, including discussing village regulations with the village head, channeling residents' aspirations, and supervising village-head performance. Article 65 of the original Village Law supplies an express quorum and a voting mechanism for BPD meetings if consensus cannot be achieved. This procedure concerns deliberation within the BPD, not an automatic entitlement to apply an equivalent voting rule to every Musdes. The distinction matters because the two forums have different membership rules and different legal authority. Uway et al. (2024) highlight the BPD's supervisory position, while Rachadian and Sulistyaningsih (2023) show that village finance creates questions about how representative oversight and direct community participation interact.

Law No. 3 of 2024 did not rewrite the core arrangements of Articles 54, 55, and 65 but altered important aspects of village governance elsewhere. As revised, Article 27 provides for the village head to communicate annual information to the community and to report at the end of the term before Musdes, alongside obligations to report to the BPD. The same amending law establishes an eight-year medium-term village development plan under Article 79. The implications of these reforms should be distinguished: an annual duty to provide information does not necessarily create an annual Musdes decision on final financial accounts, while an end-of-term public accountability report does not itself ensure regular community scrutiny of expenditure during the term.

The BPD–Musdes relationship should therefore be understood as complementary accountability rather than institutional duplication. The BPD supplies legally defined representative decision-making and oversight, while Musdes can create deliberative scrutiny of strategic proposals and of the implementation of previously agreed priorities. A stronger Musdes need not usurp BPD budget approval; it can require that understandable accounts and supporting explanations be disclosed before residents are invited to discuss priorities, revisions, or follow-up matters. Such a design respects legal competence while addressing the risks of elite capture found in deliberative planning studies (Damayanti & Syarifuddin, 2020; Briansyah & Umar B, 2024).

Procedural Safeguards, Participation, and Decisions Under Ministerial Regulation

Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019 specifies Musdes procedures in greater detail than the Village Law. It recognizes meetings planned in advance and meetings convened for particular needs, assigns the BPD a leadership role, and requires preparation by the village government. The regulation addresses representation of community groups, including women, economically disadvantaged residents, and other locally relevant groups, and recognizes rights to information, equal treatment, and protection from coercion (Arts. 10, 16, and 24). It also requires minutes and publication of deliberation results (Art. 32). These are substantive safeguards: publication can make an outcome traceable, while representation requirements may broaden the interests present when a decision is considered.

The formal right to attend does not, however, ensure the ability to participate effectively. A resident may be present but lack prior access to proposed expenditure, land records, or the criteria used to rank development projects. A procedural framework that treats deliberation as the last stage of approval may therefore amplify rather than reduce unequal access to information. Studies by Briansyah and Umar B (2024) and Sharon and Arif (2024) are instructive: the first identifies participation constraints in planning, while the second treats deliberation as part of a process of accountability rather than a purely ceremonial practice. A more protective

procedure would require advance publication of a comprehensible agenda, opportunities to submit amendments, and minutes explaining why material objections were accepted or rejected.

The treatment of deadlock warrants particular care. The technical guidance attached to Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019 expressly privileges consensus and sets aside vote counting in Musdes. It contemplates further discussion, postponement, and renewed deliberation when consensus has not yet been achieved. The issue is therefore not a complete legal silence on how to proceed, nor may a voting rule for BPD be mechanically imported into Musdes. The normative concern is whether repeated meetings can eventually produce a timely and reviewable outcome, and how nonagreement is recorded and addressed. Any proposed fallback—such as structured reconsideration, mediation facilitated by competent authorities, or a separately authorized statutory decision—must respect the existing rule until a valid legislative amendment provides otherwise.

Article 33 of the same ministerial regulation provides for consensus-based settlement of disagreements arising from the follow-up to Musdes decisions and, if that fails, facilitation by the regency or city government. This provision concerns downstream disputes and is not identical to an initial failure to agree in the meeting itself. Conceptually comparable studies of coastal policy, land disputes, and community mediation suggest that local legitimacy and institutional clarity can be complementary, although those studies examine different objects and cannot establish village-law outcomes (Harry et al., 2025, 2026; Putri & Harry, 2025). The legal safeguard should therefore distinguish deadlock before a decision from disputes after a decision, assigning appropriate procedural routes to each.

Financial Accountability and the Limits of Community Oversight

Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 20 of 2018 states that village finances must be managed transparently, accountably, participatively, and with budgetary discipline. The regulation provides for discussion and approval of village budgets through the BPD–village head process, together with duties to disclose financial information. This arrangement secures a formal representative route for budgeting, but it does not necessarily turn the broader resident forum into a mechanism for approving annual financial accounts. Rachadian and Sulistyaningsih (2023) identify a related limitation in the treatment of Musdes within village financial management. The doctrinal distinction is important: access to a summary of expenditure is a form of transparency, whereas the ability to demand a reasoned response about a deviation is a more demanding form of accountability.

Contemporary research gives reasons to take that distinction seriously without presuming identical results across contexts. Sofyani et al. (2021) associate transparency, but not every formal accountability indicator, with community trust. Permatasari et al. (2024) use national village-fund reporting data to demonstrate how data irregularities can raise accountability concerns. Putri et al. (2023) analyze vulnerabilities in internal control and participation related to corruption prevention. More recent studies show continuing interest in whether financial information systems, participation, and transparency actually strengthen governance (Oktavia & Biduri, 2024; Maharani & Widodo, 2024; Meiyenti et al., 2026). Together, these studies support a cautious normative proposition: a legally required report should be accompanied by procedures that make its content understandable, contestable, and responsive to public questions.

The findings are not uniform. Research on village funds suggests that participation, institutional capacity, and transparency can play different roles depending on the setting and measurement. Sofia and Fitriyah (2022) study those variables in the effectiveness of village-fund management; Ikhwan et al. (2024) examine their relationship with accountability; and Merawati et al. (2024) analyze transparency and community trust. Other studies consider information

technology and citizen satisfaction as additional mechanisms through which accountability may operate (Khairi et al., 2024; Yulianto et al., 2026). These empirical findings cannot simply be converted into proof that more Musdes meetings reduce misuse of funds. They justify designing accessible public scrutiny as one institutional component alongside fiscal controls, professional administration, and existing supervisory powers.

A rights-protective model of community-based integrity should accordingly include a defined annual public discussion of village financial implementation, published information on planned and actual allocations, a register of residents' questions, and a documented response to substantial discrepancies. Such a discussion would complement the BPD's statutory powers and the village head's reporting obligations; it would not replace formal audit institutions or create a power of financial adjudication not granted by law. Comparative governance scholarship supports this restrained model by focusing attention on the quality of trust, participation, and budget information (Sharon & Arif, 2024; Susi et al., 2026). The principal reform lies in transforming disclosure from a one-way announcement into an accountable and traceable exchange.

Regulatory Consistency After the 2024 Village Law Amendment

Two textual issues require harmonization. First, the Village Law uses the expression memusyawarahkan—deliberating strategic matters—while Article 1 of Minister of Villages Regulation No. 16 of 2019 characterizes Musdes as a forum to menyepakati, or reach agreement on, strategic matters. These terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive; deliberation ordinarily seeks an agreed outcome. A problem emerges only if the broader phrase in a subordinate regulation is used to expand the legal authority of Musdes beyond that supplied by statute. A legally sound interpretation maintains that the regulation may define procedures for achieving agreement without changing the allocation of competence established in the Village Law.

Second, the definition of the Village Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJM Desa) in the 2019 ministerial regulation retains a six-year reference, while Article 79 of Law No. 6 of 2014 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2024 establishes an eight-year plan. Here the inconsistency is more concrete: a subordinate definition risks directing procedural schedules by an outdated statutory period. The appropriate response is to amend the relevant ministerial provisions and associated implementing guidance so that planning, deliberation, budgeting, and accountability documents follow the eight-year framework. The principle of normative hierarchy requires the later and higher statutory rule to prevail in the event of inconsistency (Law No. 12 of 2011, as amended by Law No. 13 of 2022).

Such harmonization is more than formal drafting. If the planning horizon is inconsistent across documents, it becomes difficult for residents to assess whether a village government's annual commitments correspond to long-term priorities. Contradictory references can also undermine notice, administrative training, and the ability to challenge decisions on intelligible grounds. A relevant analogy appears in Putri and Harry's (2025) study of overlapping land administration rules, although its findings concern another legal field. The implication for this study is that consistency should be evaluated not only through the wording of provisions but through the accountability functions they enable.

A Community-Based Integrity Model for Revitalizing Musdes

The reconstructed model proposed here begins with a distinction between legal competence and procedural safeguards. Strategic decisions remain within their statutory allocation of powers; Musdes should not be elevated by administrative practice into a body entitled to exercise the powers of the BPD, district government, or audit authorities. Within that boundary, the first safeguard is transparent agenda formation. The BPD should collect proposals from different

social groups before the meeting and disclose proposed priorities and their supporting documents in comprehensible forms. The second safeguard is inclusive representation, reinforced by opportunities for residents not initially represented to seek participation as contemplated in Article 24 of the ministerial regulation.

The third safeguard is an annual accountability hearing on implementation, designed as a forum for questions and responses rather than a substitute for statutory approval of accounts. It should make planned expenditures, realization, major changes, and unfinished projects available before discussion. The fourth is reasoned decision-making. Minutes should distinguish the proposals considered, the reasons supporting the final agreed formulation, and significant dissent; merely recording that a meeting was conducted does not make disagreement traceable. The fifth is follow-up supervision, whereby published decisions are linked to deadlines, responsible institutions, and accessible progress reporting. These design choices connect an abstract value of consensus to repeated opportunities for citizen oversight.

The sixth safeguard is a legally consistent response to deadlock. Because the current Musdes framework prioritizes consensus and its technical guidance expressly avoids voting, the immediate reform should require structured reconsideration, clear documentation of points of disagreement, and a reasonable schedule for renewed meetings. If a binding decision is required by another valid legal procedure, the competent institution should act within its own delegated powers and disclose how public deliberation was considered. An alternative mandatory voting mechanism for Musdes itself would require careful revision of the applicable legal framework rather than an informal practice that contradicts the ministerial guidance. The proposed model is therefore developmental, not a claim that voting is already authorized under existing rules.

A final safeguard is accessibility. Regulations should not presume that posting a technical budget document satisfies substantive transparency; residents need clear explanations and, where necessary, offline notice or accessible forms of communication. Studies of governance and trust have emphasized the relevance of information quality to public confidence (Sofyani et al., 2021; Yulianto et al., 2026). The model is best understood as an integrated compliance cycle: information before deliberation, inclusive argument during deliberation, a traceable decision afterward, and opportunities to evaluate implementation in the following period. It seeks to reduce opportunities for purely symbolic participation without claiming that formal redesign alone will overcome power differences or guarantee the absence of corruption.

Table 1. Legal gaps and proposed safeguards for community-based village accountability.

Normative dimension	Current legal framework / issue	Prescriptive safeguard
Institutional authority	Musdes discusses strategic matters; BPD has separate representative powers.	Preserve distinct statutory competences and require a documented link between community input and decisions.
Meaningful inclusion	Participation and representation are recognized, but attendance need not imply influence.	Disclose agendas beforehand; enable underrepresented residents to submit proposals and objections.
Annual oversight	Financial disclosure is regulated, but annual public scrutiny through Musdes is not comprehensive.	Introduce an annual public accountability hearing with questions, responses, and follow-up tracking.

Planning consistency	The 2019 regulation retains a six-year RPJM Desa reference; the 2024 law uses eight years.	Amend ministerial definitions and supporting administrative guidance to reflect the current statute.
Consensus deadlock	Technical guidance privileges consensus and does not use majority voting for Musdes.	Use documented reconsideration and lawful escalation; any different voting rule requires valid reform.
Public remedy	Meeting results are published, but reasoned responses and follow-up may be less explicit.	Publish concise reasons, significant dissent, implementation milestones, and response channels.

Table 1 is a prescriptive synthesis of the statutory mapping and secondary literature. Its recommendations do not represent reforms already enacted or field-tested results. The principal institutional advantage of the model is that each safeguard corresponds to a specific stage of decision-making, enabling a clearer distinction between the duty to convene a meeting and the duty to account for its consequences.

CONCLUSION

Consensus deliberation in village governance is supported by a layered legal framework: Pancasila and the Constitution provide foundational values, the Village Law allocates institutional powers, and ministerial regulations specify Musdes procedure and village financial management. The framework distinguishes Musdes, which discusses strategic matters with community participation, from BPD meetings, which exercise representative decision-making and certain oversight functions. Its constitutional and legal significance is therefore not established by consensus rhetoric alone, but by the ability of residents to participate within a clear institutional structure.

The current framework offers rights to information, representation, and publication of deliberative outcomes, yet does not fully connect annual village financial accountability to effective community scrutiny through Musdes. The ministerial regulation's six-year planning reference is also inconsistent with the eight-year statutory framework introduced in 2024. Deliberative deadlock is not wholly unregulated: existing technical guidance privileges continued consensus-seeking and sets aside majority voting within Musdes. On these findings, revitalization should prioritize harmonized planning rules, recurring public accountability hearings, early access to comprehensible information, a documented response to dissent, and legally grounded procedures for reconsideration and follow-up. These recommendations remain doctrinal proposals whose operation should be evaluated in subsequent empirical research.

RECOMMENDATION

The competent ministries should revise planning terminology and implementing instructions to conform to Law No. 3 of 2024, while village governments and BPDs should pilot annual public accountability hearings without displacing existing approval or audit powers. Future studies should examine whether advance disclosure, representative inclusion, written responses to dissent, and implementation tracking increase residents' influence on actual budget choices. The normative character of this research limits any claim about the causal effectiveness of these recommendations.

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