Justice Between Two Truths: Gustav Radbruch’s Antinomy of Legal Values and the Impossibility of a Judgment Satisfactory to All Parties

Abstract

Judicial decisions almost always leave one party feeling aggrieved, so the expectation that courts can deliver decisions that satisfy all parties is more a normative ideal than a reality. This article examines the problem through the legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch, particularly his theory of the three basic values of law (justice, utility, and legal certainty), the antinomy among them, and the Radbruch Formula. The research uses a normative juridical method with statute, conceptual, and philosophical approaches, and a qualitative analysis based on deductive reasoning. The findings show that the antinomy of legal values is inherent in law, so every decision is the result of a choice among values that favors one party and disappoints another. The subjective conceptions of justice held by the parties, the gap between general rules and particular events, and considerations of utility further reinforce this impossibility. The Radbruch Formula provides a limit only for extreme cases, while in ordinary cases judges must still weigh the values themselves. In the Indonesian judicial system, the normative framework directing judges to explore the sense of justice does not remove the antinomy but shifts its resolution into the judge’s reasoning.